cents. It'll be even greater at closing time today.

## STATE DEPARTMENT'S REFORM IS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the majority leader announced today his intentions to bring S. 908, the State Department Authorization Bill, to the Senate floor before the August recess.

As my colleagues are well aware, this bill proposes to reorganize the agencies of the executive branch charged with the conduct of America's foreign policy, saving needed Federal tax dollars in the process.

Before my colleagues rush to judgment on the efforts to restructure the State Department, I recommend they read John Bolton's June 25 op-ed piece in the Washington Times, "Quest for a Stronger Foreign Policy Hand."

Mr. President, John Bolton writes with authority on the purpose and past performance of the State Department because of his having served as Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development in the Reagan administration and as assistant Secretary of State in the Bush administration. Currently, John Bolton serves as the president of the National Policy Forum.

I urge Senators to take note of John Bolton's counsel. His advice regarding strengthening America's foreign policy hand is both sound and sorely needed.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the June 25 op-ed piece in the Washington Times, "Quest for a Stronger Foreign Policy Hand", be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Times, June 25, 1995]
QUEST FOR A STRONGER FOREIGN POLICY HAND
(By John Bolton)

The House of Representatives has just adopted sweeping organizational changes in formulating American foreign policy. The Clinton administration has argued that the restructuring under debate—merging the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the State Department—are isolationist and unnecessary. Comparable legislation is now pending in the Senate.

Lost in the swirling and sometimes confusing arguments about reorganization is the principal point: How to strengthen the hand of the president in the conduct of foreign policy. Constitutionally, only the president can and should speak authoritatively for the United States in international matters.

The paramountcy of executive branch leadership in these affairs, however, has been repeatedly compromised by splitting, again and again, the president's authority among a multiplicity of agencies. Each agency develops its own "mission," its own political constituencies, and its own set of priorities, many or all of which may have little or no congruence with the wishes of the sitting president. The result, too often, has been interagency disagreements that retard if not entirely paralyze effective decision-making and policy implementation.

Over the years, therefore, the president's has been weakened, and his ability to act

firmly and decisively hampered. Now, in the early days of a post-Cold War era, it is precisely the right time to sweep away the bureaucratic remnants of the past, and the ossified "old thinking" they have come to embody. It is simply wrong to argue that the proponents of change are attempting to shift power between the branches. To the contrary, the proposals are intended to enhance presidential authority within his own oftenunruly family.

Advocates of USIA's continued independence, for example, argue that its news and other functions should remain rigorously independent from the tainting touch of foreign policy considerations. AID's defenders assert that providing foreign economic assistance should serve as a poverty program rather than a support for vital U.S. interests. ACDA's champions believe that only its separateness will protect the Holy Grail of arms control. In fact, the secret agenda in all three cases is to insulate the sub-Cabinet agencies from effective control by the secretary of state, for fear that their respective missions will be "politicized." In this context, "politicized" means becoming consonant with U.S. national interests, which most Americans would simply take as a given, not as a problem.

Many who wish to preserve AID's separateness, such as Vice President Al Gore, do so because they support increased spending on international population control and environmental matters rather than fundamental economic policy reforms in developing countries. The vice president's preference for condoms and trees instead of markets notwithstanding, these policies will receive long-term political support in Congress only if they are tied to enhancing demonstrable U.S. foreign policy interests.

Changes in bureaucratic structures, however, do not require or even imply changes in budget levels or program priorities. Any such changes in these areas must stand or fall on their own merits, independently of which department or agency actually implements policies and programs. Disagreements on funding and program matters can be handled through the legislative amendment process, and will change over time in any event. Anyone who has actually served in the federal government knows that one of the few effective ways to capture the bureaucracy's attention is to threaten massive changes in its budget. Even so, efforts by opponents of reorganization to confuse structure and policy are simply obscurantist at best.

These are the tired arguments of inside-the-Beltway turf warriors. They deserve exactly as much weight as the voters gave to similar arguments on the domestic front in November. In fact, most breathtaking here is the opposition to reform agencies created up to 35 years ago, a pace that would imply roughly three bureaucratic reorganizations every century.

Nonetheless it is the centrality of enhancing the president's foreign policy authority that provides the inspiring vision to the reform proposals crafted by Rep. Benjamin Gilman, New York Republican, and Sens. Jesse Helms, North Carolina Republican, and Mitch McConnell, Kentucky Republican, Rising above the narrow political temptations occasioned by the split in control between democrats in the executive and Republicans in the legislative branches, they have crafted reorganization plans that transcend today's particular partisan wrangling. They have gained widespread support-including from distinguished career Foreign Service officers like former Secretary of State Larry Eagleberger. These may be sweeping proposals, but they are not extreme.

The reforms' directions, more-over, are decidedly internationalist in their implica-

tions. Reorganization opponents have repeatedly attempted to paint efforts to achieve sound policy-making and management as isolationist, but their ad hominem rhetoric is off the mark. By attempting to evoke dark memories of pre-World War II policies, they demonstrate that they are simply unable to appreciate why new international realities require new American structures.

It is precisely to make the United States more forceful, more dynamic and more adaptable that restructuring is so necessary. Thus, the real internationalists today in foreign affairs follow the lead of predecessors who were also not afraid of massive change in process and structure. Those internationalists who were "present at the creation" of U.S. policy and institutions in the aftermath of World War II would undoubtedly be cheerleaders for the reorganizations under discussion.

How the reorganizations are actually implemented and in what period of time they must be made operational are subjects for reasonable debate, as is the degree of flexibility the president and the secretary of state should be provided in reordering the combined agencies. Important as these questions may be, however, they are simply details in the larger vision of Messrs. Gilman, Helms and McConnell.

Moreover, no one should be confused that the proposals to fold USIA, AID and ACDA into the Department of State are preferred because of any illusion that the State Department is the unique repository of superior skill or efficiency. Phase two of the reorganization process should encompass a major re-examination of attitudinal, press and management issues within the department itself.

To step back now from the reform proposals out of timidity or indecision would be to miss an historic opportunity. Soon, the House of Representatives will complete consideration of the Gilman version of reorganization, where it deserves overwhelming approval, followed by immediate action by the Senate. What President Clinton ultimately does with the legislation when it reaches him will speak volumes about whether his "reinventing government" initiative is just one more disposable promise.

## CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

## COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY REFORM ACT

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of S. 343, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (S. 343) to reform the regulatory process, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

Pending:

Dole amendment No. 1487, in the nature of a substitute.

Domenici amendment No. 1533 (to amendment No. 1487), to facilitate small business involvement in the regulatory development process.

Levin (for Glenn) amendment No. 1581 (to amendment No. 1487), in the nature of a substitute.